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Analysis of Content and Context of Historical Documents —
The Case of Petitions to the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/491
1. Document Analysis and Historical Social Research
If we study behavior, opinions or values in past societies, our data bases usually
consist of written texts. In order to analyze such material historians developed the
scrupulous techniques of ,source criticism*, a research instrument which is success-
fully used to verify the reliabüity of texts, to reconstruct the course of political
action on the level of cabinets and diplomatic Services, or to write the history of
ideas. The hermeneutical approach must faü if we want to analyze larger bodies of
documents in a standardized way which is necessary if we are going to measure
mass phenomena. In such cases we have to apply research instruments whose selec¬
tive and evaluating procedures approximately correspond to the Standards of survey
research. The different approaches to content analysis which have been developed
in the past decades, now offer a variety of tools to those historians and sociologists
who want to study collective behavior, opinions or values of the past on the basis of
written texts.
Nevertheless in Germany and moreover in Europe we can only find a few examples
of the application of content analysis to historical source material. One reason may
be the relatively large amount of work required by most approaches to content ana¬
lysis. Furthermore, the primarily psychological orientation of some Computer pro¬
grams for text analysis does not correspond to the field of interest of many poten¬
tial users. Another reason may be that different uses of language in past and present
are not considered in the Standard dictionaries. FinaUy we can observe that content
The results presented in this paper are part of a more comprehensive study of the petitions
to the Frankfurt National Assembly. For a more detaüed description of methodological approach¬
es and results, see Best, Heinrich, Die quantitative Analyse inhaltlicher und kontextueUer
Merkmale historischer Dokumente. Das Beispiel der handelspoUtischen Petitionen an die Frank¬
furter Nationalversammlung, in: Best, Heinrich, and Mann, Reinhard (eds.), Quantitative Me¬
thoden in der historisch-sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung (HSF, Vol. 3), Stuttgart 1977, pp.
162—205, and Best, Heinrich, Interessenpolitik und nationale Integration 1848/49 — Handels¬
politische Konflikte im frühindustrieUen Deutschland, Göttingen 1979. The research was partly
financed by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.
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analysis is rarely complemented by „contextual analysis*' of the documents in ques¬
tion: The examination of the political and social constellations which led to the for-
mulation of a text, the institutional framework of its distribution and even such
simple questions as who the authors were, and who the foUowers of its message
were are often neglected, As opposed to this, the drafting and distribution of texts
should be seen as a social process which involves a variety of individuals, groups or
formal organizations. We can assume that the inclusion of such aspects in the reper-
tory of content analysis will enrich our knowledge of both, text and context.
In the pages that follow I wish to give a short account of the methodological ap¬
proaches and Statistical techniques applied for coding and analyzing petitions to the
Frankfurt National Assembly. My intention is to show that the combination of tex-
tual and contextual analysis can be used as a research technique which may help to
discover motivational and structural determinants of political participation in past
societies.
2. Relevance and Validity of the Source Material
The petitions to the Frankfurt National Assembly are important data bases con¬
ceming collective political behavior and public opinion in the the years 1848/49, as
they were the most important institutional channel of mass political mobilization
after the March Revolution. In the altered institutional framework the petitions en-
abled previously unpoliticized classes to involve themselves directly in political
arguments and conflicts of interest2 .
Roughly 25,000 to 30,000 petitions, articulating the demands on the first Ger¬
man parliament of about 2.5 to 3 million signers, disprove the thesis of ,,complete
indifference of the mass and its passive role in public life** after the March Revolu¬
tion . It is no surprise that the political, clerical and economic associations and pres¬
sure groups that had come into being in 1848 soon used the petitions as a manifes-
tation and plebiscitarian justification of their demands. As there was also a great
number of local and regional interest organizations, political corporations and infor¬
mal groups included in the mobilization campaign, information conceming organi¬
zational patterns and conditions of the social structure of political action in early
industrial Germany is to be expected from an analysis of the petitions.
2
Literature on the petition movement is sparse and scattered. A broader but methodological
unsatisfying study was written by Schirrmeister, Karl-Günther, Menschenrechte in den Petitio¬
nen an die deutsche Nationalversammlung, Phü. Diss. Bamberg 1970.
See Hamerow, Theodore S., The Elections to the Frankfurt Parhament, in: The Journal of
Modern History, 33 (1961), p. 29.
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Main subjects of the petition movement were: basic human rights, inclusion of
Austria in a national German State, demands for restrictive measures of trade regu¬
lation, for the Separation of church and State, for abolition of feudal charges and
for recognition of the German Imperial Constitution by the constituent states. One
of the largest of these thematicaüy quite precisely differentiated blocs is consti¬
tuted by petitions relating to commercial policy (3,775 single petitions and 397,000
signatures). This category included aU those petitions that made concrete demands
conceming tariff policy, commented on the commercial policy of the National
Assembly and/or the provisional central govemment of the Empire, or quite gener¬
ally demanded the establishment of a German tariff union. Their relatively high
share in the total amount of the petition movement (13 %—16 %) makes evident
that violent conflicts of interest conceming commercial policy, which had been car¬
ried out during the period before the March Revolution (Vormärz) within the
governments and parliamentary representations, on the diplomatic level and in the
press, became the impulse of a mass movement under the different political condi¬
tions of 1848/49.
The significance of tariff policy as a means of economic control by the govem¬
ment as weU as the relevance of commercial disputes for the exposure of cleavage
structures are underlined by the fact that from the 1820s tariff conflicts caused
serious political splits and dominated public debates not only in Germany but also
in France, the United States and Great Britain . Thus petitions relating to commer¬
cial policy make up a group of sources the analysis of which is likely to give infor¬
mation about mobÜization processes, participation behavior and cleavage structures
in early industrial Germany. Its special value lies in the possible combination of cri¬
teria of contents and context, thus aUowing attribution of ideological and political
tendencies to regional, social and organizational connections.
In order to limit the amount of potential research issues this paper will confine
itself to the study of relations between the variations of the subject matters of the
petitions and the social setup of the respective groups of signers.
Above aU, the foUowing questions are to be addressed:
— What were the social bases of recruitment for the protectionist and the free trade
movement?
— What were the demands the signing socio-economic interest groups committed
themselves to?
— What kinds of groups cooperated in the signing of petitions?
— Which factors influenced the Cooperation of groups within the petition move¬
ment?
See, e. g., Pincus, Jonathan J., Pressure Groups and Politics in AntebeUum Tariffs, New
York 1977; McCord, Norman, The Anti-Corn Law League 1838-1846, London 1958; Ayde¬
lotte, WUUam O., The Distintegration of the Conservative Party in the 1840s: A Study of Politi¬
cal Attitudes, in: Aydelotte, Wüliam O., et aL (eds.), The Dimensions of Quantitative Research
in History, Princeton 1972, pp. 319-346.
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The findings are intended to contribute to the investigation of the widespread
theory that class conflicts which were increasing during the revolution had preven-
ted Joint political action of bourgeoisie, farmers, petty bourgeoisie and workers,
and had driven the bourgeoisie „into the arms of reaction**5.
3. Methods of Data-gathering
But before I begin to deal with the four research topics mentioned above, a short
description of the concrete procedures of transforming „sources** into „data" is in
order. In doing so I shaU confine myself to the three selected variables, „tendency**,
„reference** and „signing interest group'* which are to be subjected to several methods
of analysis in the next step.
The data have been collected using traditional interview procedures by means of
a partly standardized questionnaire. Thus unexpected variants could be taken into
consideration and the final definition of the variables could be taken up at the end
of the data record.
The following data and groups of data for each petition were recorded: location
information, date of composition, reception date, place of origin, affiliation to a
collective petition, supporting Organization, signing socio-economic pressure groups,
number of signatures, and the references. Besides, a commentary is provided to re¬
cord peculiarities. It was not until the completion of the partly standardized data
inquiry that the variables were operationally defined and the final code plan fixed.
All of the petitions relating to trade policy could be included, as far as their con¬
tents is concerned, in one of the following categories: either „protectionist", „free
trade*' or „indifferent**. This Classification was facilitated by the emergence in
1848/49 of commercial pressure groups such as the „General German Union for the
Protection of National Labour** (Allgemeiner Deutscher Verein zum Schutze der va¬
terländischen Arbeit) on the protectionist side, the „German Union for Freedom of
Trade** (Deutscher Verein für Handelsfreiheit) and the „Merchants* Union'* (Verein
von Abgeordneten des Handelsstandes) on the free trader side. These organizations
coordinated the great number of diffuse and sometimes even contradictory de-
Today, this view is shared by marxist as well as ,bourgeois' authors. See, e. g., Schmidt, Wal¬
ter, Zur RoUe der Bourgeoisie in den bürgerlichen Revolutionen von 1789 und 1848, in: Zeit¬
schrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 21(1973),pp. 301-320; Dorpalen, Andreas, Die Revolution
von 1848 in der Geschichtsschreibung der DDR, in: Historische Zeitschrift, 210 (1970), pp.
324—368; and Nipperdey, Thomas, Kritik oder Objektivität? Zur BeurteUung der Revolution
1848, in: Klötzer, Wolfgang, et al. (eds.), Ideen und Strukturen der deutschen Revolution 1848,
Frankfurt 1974, pp. 143-162.
247
mands relating to tariff policy. Their tariff drafts fixed the „official** sets of de¬
mands made by free trade and protectionist movements. Agreement or non-agree-
ment with these competitive programs relating to commercial policy could general¬
ly be taken as a criterion for the inclusion of the petitions in the categories „protec¬
tionist** or „free trade**.
Those petitions without specific demands relating to tariff policy, demanding
merely the establishment of economic unity throughout Germany, reconciliation
of antagonistic points of view or consultation of experts for the formulation of the
tariff, were labelled „indifferent**.
Petitions relating to trade policy distributed among the three basic categories of
contents as follows:
Tab. 1: Distribution of Petitions Among Basic Categories of Contents
tendency absolute frequency relative frequency
(in percent)
protectionist 3,400 90.1
free trade 347 9,2
indifferent 28 0.7
3,775 100.0
Apart from this rough Classification of the petitions according to contents, the
individual grievances were listed as well. It soon turned out that the sets of grievances
were relatively deficient in variants; more than 89 % of the petitions belonged to a
total of 52 collective petitions the texts of which had been previously formulated
and supraregionally distributed. Central control of the agitation by free trade and
protectionist leagues contributed to further standardization of contents.
These conditions enabled us to do without a comphcated coding pattern:The
grievances we identified were defined as dichotomous variables, which means that
each petition was classified according to presence or absence of every individual re¬
ference. Reasons and commentaries given in the petitions were not embodied in the
data set, but were nevertheless considered significant material and recorded in the
questionnaires. A selection of the grievances recorded is to be found in Table 4.
2,772 petitions (- 73.4 % of all petitions relating to trade policy) contained infor¬
mation about the social position (Stand) of the signers, appearing sometimes as a
collective label (example: „We,the Trittenheim wine growers, demand . . .*'), from
November 1848 on as an addition to the individual signature. An allusion to a
heterogeneous group of supporters was an important argument in favour of com¬
mercial demands, and it became a common practice to provide one column in the
list of signatures for the signers to enter their „social position*' (Stand).
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With regard to the extremely diffuse Statements characterizing „social position**
overaU social categories had to be established to take into account peculiarities of
material as well as special problems of research. Given these conditions, the forma¬
tion of pressure groups Organization in 1848 seemed to be the most appropriate
pattern for Classification of the various descriptions of occupation; it represented
an immediate clue to problems relating to policy of interest and at the same time
took into consideration the contemporary perception of the social system.
In contrast, I refrained from imposing a model of social stratification or cate¬
gories of occupation lacking an equivalent in contemporary conceptions, as it can
be assumed that specific forms of political action and collective ideological tenden¬
cies have been developed in the actual context of cooperating pressure groups rather
than within the framework of social categories defined ex post facto. This way I
was also able to avoid certain problems of stratification and grouping that tend to
obstruct analysis of social phenomena especially of the 19th Century.
The definition of the socio-economic pressure groups used for social Classification
thus follows the pattern for Organization of economic pressure groups in 1848/49.
Farmers organized in a „Congress of Delegates of German Agricultural Associations'*
(Kongreß der Abgeordneten deutscher landwirtschaftlicher Vereine), master crafts¬
men in the „German Congress of Craftsmasters" (Deutscher Handwerker- und Ge¬
werbekongreß), workers in the „General German Worker's Congress'* (Allgemeiner
deutscher Arbeiterkongreß) and in the „Berlin Workers' Congress" (Berliner Ar¬
beiterkongreß), merchants in a „Merchants* Union*' (Verein von Abgeordneten
des Handelsstandes) and manufacturers in the „General German Union for the
Protection of National Labour" (Allgemeiner Deutscher Verein zum Schutz der va¬
terländischen Arbeit), which had been founded as a manufacturers' Organization.
An extra group such as the wine growers articulated their demands in the „Assemb-
lies of German Wine- and Fruit Producers" (Versammlungen der Deutschen Wein-
und Obstproduzenten), employees in the textüe industries also founded their first
Organization, the „Association of Saxon Spinning Clerks" (Verein Sächsischer Spin¬
nereibeamter). These national assemblies and top organizations were established on
a broad basis of local organizations and informal groups; one can thus infer that
many everyday social contacts took place within the framework of socio-economic
interest groups as well.
Apart from the socio-economic pressure groups mentioned here were, however,
some groups that had made no effort to form organizations, although they had
been assigned a clearly limited position in society. Either motivational or material
resources for the development of a corporate structure were lacking in these cases.
This applies in the first place to civil servants, to members of academic professions,
and to the largest group in early industrial society — the agricultural labourers. Be¬
cause of their special significance as supporters or subjects of the trade mobüization
campaign these groups were included in the set of variables as independent social
categories in spite of the lack of specific corporations. With regard to these ex¬
ceptions I have assigned the given descriptions of occupation to the ten socio-econo¬
mic pressure groups: manufacturers, merchants, farmers, master craftsmen, work-
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ers, clerks, wine- and tobacco growers, members of academic professions, civü ser¬
vants and agricultural labourers. The inclusion of individual professions in these
groups tended to follow the contemporary craft statistics which was to a certain ex¬
tent divided into simüar categories .
Recording the data, I defined each pressure group as a dichotomous variable and
registered its presence or absence in the lists of signatures. Thus the affüiation of an
individual signature to a certain group was not recorded. Consequently we cannot
make Statements like „in petition X, 10 % of the signers were manufacturers'* but
only Statements such as „workers signed in 20,3 % of all petitions**. This procedure
had its basis and justification in the hypothesis that the signing of petitions was the
result of Joint decisions made within the framework of socio-economic pressure
groups and, thus, represented the intention of the group.
This assumption is supported by the fact that in 62,5 % of the cases in which in¬
formation about the signers' social position was available the respective pressure
groups signed petitions isolated from each other. A further 27,5 % of cases concen¬
trated on 20 types of group Cooperation in signing petitions (example: manufactur¬
ers together with workers and clerks). On the whole, 90 % of the petitions were
distributed among 30 types of group representation which make up 2,9 % of a total
of 1,024 theoretical possibüities of Cooperation. This finding signifies that the
members of the various pressure groups signed either on their own or selectively to¬
gether with an exclusive set of social partners — a finding that definitely supports
the initial hypothesis.
4. A Relational Analysis of Content and Context
of Petitions to the Frankfurt National Assembly
Subsequent to this short description of the set of variables that was analyzed I
am going to answer the four research questions referred to above.
In 1848/49, when plebiscitary support of commercial demands was supposed to
have an effective bearing on political decisions, mobüization of a numerous and so-
ciaUy heterogenous foUowing was more than ever the aim and measure of success in
agitation by protectionists as well as free traders. In this stage the different bases of
recruitment of protectionist and free trade petition movements show the possibüi¬
ties as well as the limits of their wooing adherents.
See, e. g., Statistische Mitteüungen aus dem Königreich Sachsen, Dresden 1854, and Tabel¬
len und amtliche Nachrichten aus dem preußischen Staat für das Jahr 1849, Vols. 4—6, Berlin
(no year).
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Tab. 2: The Representation of Socio-Economic Pressure Groups in the
Protectionist- and Free Trade Movements
pressure groups protectionist petitions
N %*
free trade petitions
N %*
manufacturers 411 16.0
merchants 300 11.9
farmers 523 20.8
master craftsmen 1,094 43.6
workers 753 30.0
clerks 81 3.2
public servants 74 2.9
academic professions 27 1.1
agricultural labourers 156 6.2
wine- and tobacco growers 852 33.9
15 6.1
168 68.3
74 30.1
51 20.7
12 4.9
5 2.0
22 8.9
16 6.5
38 15.4
0 0.0
N = 2,511 N= 246
* percentages are adding up to more than 100 %.
Tab. 3: Distribution of Pressure Groups between the Protectionist and Free Trade Movements
pressure groups protectionist petitions free trade petitions
N N %* dev.from**
mean
N % dev. from***
mean
manufacturers 426 411 96.5 + 5.4 15 3.5 - 5.4
merchants 468 300 64.1 -27.0 168 35.9 + 27.0
farmers 597 523 87.6 - 3.5 74 12.4 + 3.5
master craftsmen 1,145 1,094 95.5 + 4.4 51 4.5 - 4.5
workers 765 753 98.4 + 7.3 12 1.6 - 7.3
clerks 86 81 94.2 + 3.1 5 5.8 - 3.1
public servants 96 74 77.1 -14.0 22 22.9 + 14.0
academic professions 43 27 62.8 -28.3 16 37.2 + 28.3
agricultural labourers 194 146 80.4 -10.7 38 19.6 + 10.7
wine- and tobacco grow. 852 852 100.0 + 8.9 0 0.0
- 8.9
* row-values of columns 3 and 6 are adding up to 100.0%.
**
mean share of protectionist petitions in all petitions conceming tariff policy: 91.1 %.
***
mean share of free trade petitions in all petitions conceming tariff policy: 8.9 %.
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In interpreting the results of Table 2, the different degrees of success of free
trade and protectionist movements must, of course, be taken into account: There
were 2,511 protectionist petitions supplying information about the signing pressure
groups compared to no more than 246 corresponding petitions for free trade. For
example farmers were represented in 30 % of all free trade petitions, whereas 87.6%
of all petitions in which farmers were represented, were protectionist (see Table 3).
Tables 2 and 3 reveal that free traders remained confined to a great extent to
their traditional core of adherents — the merchants. Traditions of the period before
the March Revolution were resumed by rather frequent representation of civil ser¬
vants and members of academic professions. The groups of farmers and agricultural
labourers which were likely to be in favour of free trade at least in those cultivation
areas depending on export, were represented above average in the free trade petitions;
but nevertheless the protectionist advantage could not nearly be made up for even
in the agricultural sphere. Groups such as manufacturers, master craftsmen, workers
and clerks were represented below average.
On the other hand, the protectionists found the main part of their following
among the industrial and agricultural middle- and lower classes. The group of wine
and tobacco growers, which was not at all represented in free trade petitions, held
the second place of all categories. On the whole, members of agricultural profes¬
sions were represented in 55,5 % of aU protectionist petitions, workers and master
craftsmen in 57.7 %. In view of the success in mobilizing these groups, the tradi¬
tional core of adherents of the protectionist movement — the manufacturers — lost
some of its import. Nevertheless manufacturers committed themselves to protection¬
ist petitions to a considerably greater extent than merchants committed themselves
to free trade petitions. It comes as a surprise that this protectionist advantage even
applied to the group of merchants that voted much more frequently for restrictions
by means of tariff policy than for free trade.
One reason for the protectionist movement's vast success in mobilizing the
various socio-economic pressure groups might have been their disposal to match the
uniform and purposeful agitation of the „General German Union for the Protection
of National Labour'* (Allgemeiner deutscher Verein zum Schutze der vaterländi¬
schen Arbeit). This advantage, though, is but an insufficient explanation for the
protectionist success as the Propaganda impulses had to go along with appropriate
motivational incentives and readiness for cooperative political action on the part of
the pressure groups in order to lead to the signing of trade petitions: It is also the
different reactions to agitation that may serve as an explanation for the different
mobüization effects as well as different bases of recruitment of protectionist and
free trade movements.
If one wants to reveal the motives of pressure groups for their participation in
the trade petition movement, one could reasonably take it as an initial hypothesis
that they signed petitions above aU because of their commitment to individual
topics contained in the petitions. In fact no arbitrary relations between readiness to
sign petitions and the existence of certain subject matters are to be expected: pres¬
sure groups frequently voted for specific sets of demands submitted to them either
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by their own organizations or by national free trade or protectionist associations,
the aim being the achievement of the highest degree of mobilization that could pos¬
sibly be reached.
I have depicted the relations between the variables „signing pressure group'* and
„reference" by means of a matrix of (j)coefficients. In the present case,(f)reaches its
maximum value if the appearance of a group always goes along with the occurrence
of a certain subject matter, whereas other groups do not vote for this grievance. In
case a group tended not to appear in the lists of signatures referring to a special sub¬
ject matter, the value is negative7. As it can hardly be decided whether this absten¬
tion is due to indifference or delibarate refusal on the part of the group not repre¬
sented, these negative coefficients have been neglected. In order to facilitate the
interpretation of the results, it was decided that the same should apply to coef¬
ficients below .10 (rounded up). If measuring the relation between the occurence of
a certain subject matter and the signing of the respective petitions by a pressure
group resulted in a coefficient ofCJ)^ .10 this was regarded as evidence for the »com¬
mitment* of this group in favour of the subject matter in question.
Detaüed interpretation of all the results of Table 4 would go beyond the scope
of this paper. Nontheless I would like to record three points that seem important to
me:
— Obviously, there was only a small number of demands distinctly appealing to
specific groups (wine growers — wine tariffs etc.). Most of the grievances were sup¬
ported by a heterogenous following.
— Common attachment to certain grievances united different pressure groups. It
must be considered whether this common articulation of interests led to direct in¬
teraction of the groups within the petition movement.
— Individual groups committed themselves to demands that were directly opposed
to each other. At this point the effect of a distinctly sectional cleavage structure be¬
comes obvious, Splitting up for instance the merchants in their entirety into two
groups: one group of merchants from northern Germany, committed to export
trade and clearly preferring free trade measures; and a second group of merchants
from the western and southern parts of Germany, committed to inland trade and
protective tariffs.
7
The version of (pused in this paper (with signs) is described in Benninghaus, H., Deskriptive
Statistik, Stuttgart 1977. The calculation of ({)was derived from 2x2 tables of the foUowing
type:
protest against free trade tariff
not mentioned mentioned
not represented 566 987 1553
master
craftsmen represented 543 512 105 5
1109 1499 2608
0= 0.15
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Tab. 4: „Commitment" of Pressure Groups in Favour of Particular Subject Matters
(0coefficients)
Grievances* Manuf. Merch. Farm, Mast. Work. Vine grow.
Support of an immediate establishment of
the German commercial union 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.10
Support of the convocation of a congress
of experts in order to decide the tariff
questions 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.15
Support of raising tariffs on iron 0.10 0.26
Support of raising tariffs on textües 0.10 0.10
Support of decreasing tariffs on raw
materials and foodstuff 0.22
Refusal of export duties 0.20
Support of export duties 0.13
Support of a combination of protective
tariffs and restrictive guild-laws 0.15
Support of high tariffs on wine 0.92
Support of high tariffs on tobacco 0.12
Support of high tariffs on sugar 0.15
Support of reciprocal trade agreements 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.35 0.28
Refusal of reciprocal trade agreements 0.31
Support of the motion of Eisenstuck
and others 0.17
Refusal of the motion of Eisenstuck
and others 0.15
Support of the draft of a protectionist tariff 0.10 0.17 0.29
Support of the general aims of the
protectionist league 0.20 0.10
Support of the draft of a free trade tariff 0.34
* Only such grievances were noted, to which the commitment of at least one pressure group
was indicated by a([)*> 0.10. The commitment of public servants to particular grievances was
generaly lesser than the liminal value of(J)= 0.10. Holders of academic professions tended to re-
ject the motion of Bernhard Eisenstuck (0= 0.13) and were incüned to support the free trade
tariff «J)= 0.10). Agricultural labourers tended to support the general aims of the protectionist
league (d)= 0.15). On the other hand they were inclined to support the free trade tariff ((J)=
0.13). The texts of some grievances had to be abbreviated in case of space shortage.
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Tab. 4: „Commitment** of Pressure Groups in Favour of Particular Subject Matters
((jpcoefficients)
Refusal of the draft ofa free trade tariff 0.5 8
Distrust of the Frankfurt National Assembly
in case of its protectionist preposessions 0.15
Protest againts the retardation of the pro¬
tectionist program by the National Assembly
and/or the minister of trade 0.15 0.18 0.25 0.50
At this point the question arises as to what extent participation of the various
socio-economic pressure groups in the petitions can be explained by commitment
to the subject matters of the petitions. As opposed to the preceding analysis, we
shall refrain from investigating how far the individual demand was connected with
participation or non-participation of a pressure group in petitions. We shaU rather
examine how far participation was influenced by the set of grievances as a whole.
In order to ascertain the strength of this relationship, r2 was used, giving the
„proportion of explained Variation in per cent**. In the present case, e. g., the value
of the (multiple) correlation between occurrence of certain grievances in the peti¬
tions and representation of craftsmen in the lists of signatures of R2 = 0.51, was
interpreted to the effect that participation or non-participation can be ,,explained**
by the presence or absence of certain grievances to a total of 51%8.
Tab. 5: „Commitment** of Pressure-Groups to the Set of Grievances as a Whole
2
pressure groups multiple R : total set of grievances/representation
of interest groups
manufacturers R2 = 0.22
merchants R2 = 0.28
farmers R2 = 0.27
master craftsmen R2 = 0.51
workers R2 = 0.50
clerks R2 = 0.03
public servants R2 = 0.03
academic professions R = 0.05
agricultural labourers R =0.12
2
wine- and tobacco growers R =0.91
in all cases: s = 0.000
D
The assumption that the grievances were independent variables was derived from the fact
that in most cases signers supported previously formulated texts. Seidom they influenced the
formulation of petitions directly. For the justification of an apphcation of multiple correlation
analysis to dichotomous variables see Blalock, Hubert M., Social Statistics, 2nd. ed., New York
1972, pp. 454 ff., 498 ff.
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The results reveal characteristic differences between the pressure groups as re¬
gards their commitment to the sets of demands offered.
Clerks, public servants and members of academic professions tended but to a small
degree to focus on certain subject matters of the petitions. Their indifference sug¬
gests that they did not develop any independent centers of interest as far as tariff
policy is concerned, and that their participation in the petition movement was only
a subsidiary one. The same applies to the agricultural labourers whose mobilization
was evidently only slightly more connected to the presence of certain demands in
petitions. This outcome remarkably corresponds with the fact that in 1848/49 the
groups mentioned did not establish any independent organizations on the national
level. In contrast to theses groups, wine- and tobacco growers petitioned almost ex¬
clusively for grievances referring to their own specific interests. Petitions of workers
and master craftsmen included subjects relating to specific groups as well, though
without focusing on an exclusive subject. Obviously, however, specific demands had
to be contained in the texts in order to induce them to participate.
On the other hand, manufacturers, merchants and farmers concentrated less dis¬
tinctly on special grievances. In the case ofthe two groups mentioned first, their rela¬
tive indifference can be accounted for by the fact that they were the initiators of the
free trade and protectionist petition movements. So they were directly involved in
the distribution of different text versions and in this function signed copies the de¬
mands of which were traced out for other groups as well. In the case of those far¬
mers not specialized in wine- and tobacco growing, who, with the exception of
sugar customs, did not make any demands for agrarian protectionism, relative indif¬
ference is rather due to a „hanger-on-effect**; an assumption that shall be supported
by further evidence elsewhere.
To summarize, it is to be kept in mind that „issue-orientation" was no doubt an
important motive for signing trade petitions. With the exception of wine and tobac¬
co growers, however, this factor by itself is only an insufficient explanation for par¬
ticipation of pressure groups in the petition movement.
An indication of further attempts at an explanation was given by the allusion to
a „hanger-on-effect**: Obviously the social relations between pressure groups had a
bearing on their participation in the protectionist and free trade petition move¬
ment. A comparison of the values given in Table 5 for commitment in favor of sets
of grievances on the one hand and relative frequency of isolated signing of texts by
pressure groups on the other hand supports the assumption that „issue-orientation(<
and involvement in Systems of social relationship were complementary impulses for
participation of pressure groups in petitions.
The results reveal that groups which were distinctly attached to certain grievances,
tended to sign petitions on their own, whereas groups which were relatively indiffer¬
ent to the subject matters, petitioned almost exclusively together with their social
partners. Table 6 supports the assumption that analysis of social relations estab¬
lished by pressure groups within the framework of the petition movement suggest
further evidence as to the impulses for their participation. For analysis of the pat¬
terns of interaction reflected by the lists of signatures, I made also use of Configu-
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Tab. 6: „Commitment** of Pressure Groups in Favour of the Set of Grievances and Relative Fre¬
quencies of Isolated Signing of Petitions
pressure groups „commitment** frequencies of isolated signing
N %*
manufacturers R2 = 0.22 109 25.2
merchants R2 = 0.28 150 31.8
farmers R2 = 0.27 78 13.0
master craftsmen R2 = 0.51 364 31.6
workers R2 = 0.50 203 26.5
clerks R2 = 0.03 5 5.8
public servants R2 = 0.03 3 3.1
academic professions R = 0.05 0 0.0
agricultural labourers R2 = 0.12 11 5.8
wine-and tobacco growers R
= 0.91 809 94.8
* The proportion is related to the total number of petitions signed by the respective pressure
groups (basic values, see Tab. 3, col. 1).
ration Frequency analysis (CFA)9, a Statistical instrument developed by E. A . Lie¬
nert and J. Krauth for use in psychology. CFA measures the frequency of occur¬
rence of particular configurations — in the present case for instance Joint signing of
protectionist petitions by workers, manufacturers and clerks — and compares this
value to the probabüity of occurrence of the respective configuration (expected
value). Inherent structures of Cooperation of the various pressure groups may be ta¬
ken for granted if the frequency of occurrence of a certain pattern of interaction is
significantly higher than expected. The configuration „manufacturer, worker,clerk**
for instance is to be expected only once, whereas there are in fact 22 protectionist
petitions jointly signed by these groups; a discrepancy between expected value and
observed value revealing an underlying regularity that requires interpretation.
The results of CFA have been visualized by a diagram using the technique of
SmaUest Space Analysis10. By this means the different pressure groups were arranged
9
See Krauth, Joachim and Lienert, Gustav Adolf, KFA. Die Konfigurationsfrequenzanalyse
und ihre Anwendung in Psychologie und Medizin, Freiburg 1973. For computerized analysis I
used the program KONFA which was written by Burkhard Roeder. For a more detaüed descrip¬
tion of KONFA see Roeder, Burkhard, Die Konfigurationsfrequenzanalyse nach Krauth und Lie¬
nert. Ein handliches Verfahren zur Verarbeitung sozialwissenschaftlicher Daten, demonstriert
an einem Beispiel, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 26 (1974), pp.
819-844.
Lingoes, James C, The Guttman-Lingoes Nonmetric Program Series, Ann Arbor/Mich. 19 73.
For the Analysis of the Petitions I used the program SSA I/MINISSA I.
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within a two-dimensional system of coordinates in such a way that groups cooperat¬
ing rather frequently, such as farmers and agricultural labourers, are plotted close to
one another, whereas groups which rarely signed petitions together, such as workers
and academics, are plotted farer apart. Thus social distance as far as it was revealed
during the petition movement is measured by the distance between the different
groups, whereas the characteristic types of group Cooperation, as identified by aid
of CFA, are marked by the connecting lines (see Diagrams 1 and 2).
Diagram 1: Interaction Pattem of the Protectionist Petition Movement
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Diagraml: KruskaFs Stress = 0.115
Legend to Diagrams 1 and 2:
O
< *
significant frequent isolated signing of one group
significant frequent interaction between two groups
significant frequent interaction between three groups
significant frequent interaction between four groups
significant frequent interaction between five groups
FABR = manufacturers LARB = agricultural labourers
KAUF = merchants ANG = clerks
HADW = master craftsmen AKAD = academic professions
LADW = farmers BEAM = public servants
ARB = workers
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Diagram 2: Interaction Pattern of the Free Trade Petition Movement
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Diagram 2: Kruskal's Stress = 0.089
Two clearly different substructures can be discerned regarding the social interac¬
tion pattern of the protectionist petition movement: a „rural** and an „urban** net¬
work, master craftsmen and workers acting as intermediaries between them. Close
relationship between workers, master craftsmen, farmers and agricultural labourers
can be accounted for by the connection of proto-industry and agriculture within
the framework of rural domestic industry. Obviously the protectionist movement
succeeded in exploiting for its mobüization campaign the close social contacts de¬
veloping between the different producer groups in the country. Because of their
simultaneous affüiation to „rural** and „urban** milieu craftsmen and workers de¬
veloped much more complex patterns of interaction than the other groups. As far as
workers are concerned, this finding contradicts the obvious suspicion that they
generally had been forced to participate in the protectionist movement by pressure
exerted by the manufacturers: only 26.9 % of all protectionist petitions that were
signed by workers were at the same time signed by manufacturers, whereas in
26.5 % of all cases workers petitioned without any participation of other groups. In
the case of the master craftsmen we are Struck by an especially close connection to
the farmers, linking them closer to the rural than to the urban milieu.
Manufacturers belonged to two different fields of interaction as well. A system
of relations, also including clerks and workers, can be accounted forby the Coopera¬
tion of these groups within the framework of industrial companies, whereas Joint
signing of petitions with merchants and craftsmen reflects relations between indus¬
trial and commercial elements of urban economy. Academics and civü servants did
not have any significant relations to other groups within the framework of the pro¬
tectionist petition movement.
Within the free trade petition movement too, we have a „rural** as well as an
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„urban** pattern of interaction connected by craftsmen and public servants11. Co¬
operation of the groups involved on the free trade side, however, was significantly
rarer than on the protectionist side. It comes as a surprise that merchants, being the
most important supporters of the free trade movement, held a peripheral position
within its System of social relations. This gap between the core of the interested
and the group of people addressed can be taken to be one reason for the failure of
the free trade mobilization campain12.
In the free trade movement groups concerned tended to cooperate less and less
as time went on: the proportion of petitions with isolated group representation in¬
creased from 62,0 % of 78,2 % subsequent to November 1848 when the campaign
in favor of the free trade tariff project was unleashed. Contrary to the intention of
its initiators the free trade tariff had anything but a supporting and unifying effect
for an overall free trade petition movement but rather seems to have increased the
isolation of north German foreign trade merchants.
To make possible a comparison between free trade petitions and protectionist petitions I
eliminated those petitions which were supported by wine- and tobacco growers. This procedure
did not affect the patterns of interaction of the other groups, because wine- and tobacco growers
signed nearly in aü cases without participation of other groups.
Confifurations were noted if theü* probabüity of occurence was <i).l % and if their absolute
frequency was ^5.
intercating pressure groups expected value frequency
FARM, WORK, AGRLABR
FARM, MAST, AGRLABR
FARM, MAST, WORK
FARM, MAST, WORK, AGRLABR
MANF, WORK, CLERK
MANF, MAST, WORK, CLERK
MANF, MERCH, MAST
MANF, MERCH, MAST, WORK
MANF, MERCH, MAST, CLERK
In the case of free trade petitions I used the same selective procedures as for protectionist
petitions. Only the liminal value for the frequency of configurations was reduced from 5 to 3,
because the number of free trade petitions was significantly smaller than the number of protec¬
tionist petitions.
interacting pressure groups expected value frequency
FARM (isolated)
FARM, AGRLABR
FARM, MAST, PUBSERV, AGRLABR
MERCH (isolated)
MERCH, PUBSERV, ACADS
MANUF, MERCH, MAST, ACADS
N=246
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4 19
7 41
37 108
3 13
1 22
1 10
13 37
5 32
0 8
N = 2510
9 33
7 12
0 3
7 124
0 3
0 3
On the other hand, protectionist patterns of interaction gradually took shape:
Prior to November 1848, which means before agitation was controlled by the pro¬
tectionist league, 87,8 % of protectionist petitions subjected to CFA were signed by
the pressure groups separately; subsequent to November 1848, this proportion went
down to 28,3 %. Formation of the characteristic patterns of interaction, as for in¬
stance development of „rural** and „urban** Systems of relations, did not occur un¬
tü the second stage.
Reasons for the significant change of participation behaviour can be found in the
different techniques of Organization of petitions and in the different tenor of pro¬
tectionist agitation. Prior to November 1848, organizations and grievances specifi¬
cally -conceming particular groups prevaüed, whereas the mobilization campaign of
the „General German Union for the Protection of National Labour** increasingly re-
lied on overall patterns of Organization combining concessions to specific interests
with an appeal to the common „material interests of the nation**. In spite of the
fact that latent conflicts continued to exist the protectionist program displayed
considerable integrating power. Only the wine- and tobacco growers were mobilized
almost exclusively by specific demands and largely without participation of other
groups.
Analysis of the patterns of interaction by means of CFA revealed that Coopera¬
tion of groups was determined by their affüiation to a particular „milieu**. Remem¬
ber the discovery of „rural** and „urban** Systems of relations or the significance of
working in the same factory. At this point the question arises which basic social
conditions and which motives influenced group Cooperation and, on the other hand,
which weight has to be assigned to these determinants.
In order to reveal connections of this kind, factor analysis seems to be the most
appropriate instrument. In the present study entries announcingpresenceor absence
of the ten socio-economic pressure groups in the petitions were intercorrelated as
original variables. Factors influencing their relations were interpreted as clustering
forces determining Cooperation of these groups within the petition movement. Free
trade and protectionist petitions were analyzed separately as CFA had revealed dif¬
ferent patterns of interaction, and comparison of the contrasting groups promised
additional possibüities of interpretation.
As to the protectionist movement, factor analysis revealed four determinants of
group Cooperation1 . One factor, identified as „working together'*, most signifi¬
cantly influenced relations between pressure groups. It accounts for 50.3 % of vari¬
ance and above all determined Cooperation of manufacturers, workers and clerks.
Second was one factor signifying „living together in the country*' (21.7 % of vari¬
ance), showing high factor scores for farmers and agricultural labourers, and another
factor denoting „perceived identity of interests** (16,4 % of variance), showing
high scores for craftsmen and lower scores for manufacturers, merchants, workers
and farmers. A factor standing for „social proximity of local dignitaries** was least
13
I used SPSS, vers. CDC 6.0, subprogram FACTOR, method PA 2, orthogonal Solution
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significant (11.6 % of variance). This factor showed high scores for public servants
and academic professions, and considerably lower scores for manufacturers and
merchants.
Almost the same determinants of group Cooperation are discernible within the
free trade petition movement14. Only the factor denoting „social proximity** is lack¬
ing here. Within the free trade petition movement the factor standing for „living to¬
gether in the country**, accounting for 45,9 % of variance, was of the greatest impo-
tance for Cooperation behaviour, succeeded by the factor signifying „perceived
identity of interests'* with 41.5%. The factor identified as „working together",
which showed high scores for craftsmen and workers within the free trade move¬
ment, follows with 12.6 %.
(VARIMAX). See Nie, Norman H., et al., SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 2nd.
ed., New York 1975, pp. 480 ff.
The foUowing factor scores were calculated:
MANUF
MERCH
FARM
MAST
WORK
CLERK
PUBSERV
ACAD
AGRLABR
PCT of Var.
FACTOR 1
(„working
together")
FACTOR 2
(„living
together")
FACTOR 3
(„perceiv. id.
of interests*')
- 0.05
- 0.95
0.70
0.12
0.08
0.04
0.05
- 0.10
0.55
45.9
0.35
0.16
0.11
0.53
0.04
0.37
0.66
43.66
- 0.05
41.5
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.57
0.61
0.13
0.09
0.04
0.22
12.6
FACTOR 4
(„social
proximity")
MANUF 0.56 - 0.15 0.19 0.14
MERCH 0.21 - 0.07 0.29 0.26
FARM - 0.03 0.65 0.20 0.02
MAST - 0.04 0.20 0.73 0.06
WORK 0.48 0.30 0.15 - 0.06
CLERK 0.46 0.00 0.04 0.10
PUBSERV - 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.60
ACAD 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.52
AGRLABR 0.02 0.47 0.05 0.09
WINEGROW - 0.41 - 0.34 - 0.71 0.02
PCT of Var. 50.3 21.7 16.4 11.4
14
Factor scores:
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
(„living („perceiv. id. („working
together*') of interests") together'*)
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The results of factor analysis suggest that existing Systems of social relations like
„living together** and „working together** played a more important role for Coopera¬
tion of pressure groups within the petition movement than mere ideological deter¬
minants such as the factor standing for „perceived identity of interests** did. The
protectionists were able to benefit from existing social relations within social Sub¬
systems to a greater extent than free traders, whose more abstract grievances led to
a more ideologically determined Cooperation of pressure groups.
5. Conclusion
The results presented have revealed that the assumption that class conflicts had in¬
creased during 1848 and 1849 and prevented Joint political action of bourgeoisie,
workers, farmers and craftsmen, is at least not true of the trade petition movement.
Especially the protectionist movement actually succeeded in expanding the basis of
recruitment for their petition campaign beyond the limits of status and müieu. Con¬
flicts between socio-economic pressure groups could be concealed by nationalist
economic Propaganda at least for the topic under consideration and at least during
the period under research.
It was only subsequent to November 1848, in a period when according to most
authors, the bourgeoisie fled „into the arms of reaction" for fear of the social de¬
mands of the Proletariat and petty bourgeoisie, that the patterns of interaction of
the groups participating in the petition campaign took shape and the protectionist
mass movement reached its climax
The need to revise some current views of the Revolution of 1848/49 — which I
experienced myself in the necessity of revising some of my own expectations — in¬
dicates once more that knowledge in collective behavior and opinions of past socie¬
ties cannot be derived from scattered citations or with reference of contemporary
authorities. As opposed to that it needs gathering of mass data in a standardized
way and the application of Statistical analyses. Content analysis will be an impor¬
tant research instrument for a „collective history'* of this type, whose databases
nearly exclusively consists of written text. Systematic inclusion of a „contextual
analysis'* into the repertory of content analysis could be essential to its adoption
and expansion in the field of quantitative history because contextual analysis of
historical documents opens further dimensions of research and could form a metho¬
dological link to traditional historical „source criticism".
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